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Abstract
The article enquires about the role of researchers in an era of increasingly competitive 
innovation in the media industry. I argue that research-driven change in the mass media is 
possible, and that there should be more of it in the future. More democratic participation 
in mass media is the issue that most urgently needs to be resolved, and in Part II I will 
point out a possible strategy of reformation in the field. The article is a form of meta-theory 
or ‘theory of science’, and it zooms in on the normative attitude of the social researcher 
towards the larger society. The first part is a history of normativity in modern American 
and European social science from the 1920s onwards, with a focus on media studies. It 
sets the background for a framework for instructive media research, that is, research in 
which a normative goal is pursued with all the tools that social research can legitimately 
apply. I present three sectors of the media that can be directly and indirectly controlled by 
the researcher: the media’s technical platforms, their editorial procedures, and citizens’ 
participation in the media. 
Keywords: media research, democracy, critical research, administrative research, instruc-
tive research
Introduction
The growing influence of ‘new media’ in social life coincides with the frenzy of in-
novation on the Internet and in mobile phone technology, and this development chal-
lenges the importance of old media like newspapers, radio and television. In the present 
article, I enquire about the role of media researchers in relation to this growth in new 
communicative practices. 
Let me first remind you that the greatest sin of media researchers is to take the innova-
tions at face value. “We specialise in undoing media hubris” Kaarle Nordenstreng (2007: 
219) claims on behalf of media researchers. Most forms of communicative interaction 
were improved by electronic and digital means during the 20th century, but it is not obvi-
ous that the quality of communication has improved along with the means. Even though 
communication has become more efficient, it has not by implication become more 
democratic. There is a risk that innovations will actually stall societal progress, and thus 
new media developments should be vigorously investigated by researchers in order to 
reduce this risk. Investigating the role of researchers is a form of meta-theory or ‘theory 
of science’, and zooming in on social researchers’ normative attitudes towards the larger 
society furthermore makes the present study a hermeneutical and political one. 
4The most progressive way for researchers to approach the issue would be to design 
independent prototypes of new media alongside those of the commercial businesses, and 
to promote them systematically in public life. A writer as unlikely as Marshall McLuhan 
(1911-1980) recommended such an attitude. He said that the media researcher should 
move from the ivory tower to the control tower (Grossweiler 1998: 90), and thereby 
reiterated what Karl Marx famously said a hundred years before: “Philosophers have 
only interpreted the world differently, what matters is to change it” (Carver (ed.) 1991: 
3). I agree with McLuhan and Marx that researchers should take control of at least some 
features of the media’s social and political functions in order to improve them.
However, the tradition of progressive media research is weak in Nordic media studies, 
despite our shared social-democratic heritage since the 1940s, and our army of social 
engineers in fields like education, social services, healthcare, etc. Here I will formulate 
a theoretical rationale for an instructive attitude towards mass media and communica-
tion, and I am particularly interested in exploiting the potential for democratization in 
new media during the next 20-30 years.
The first part of the article is a history of normativity in modern American and Euro-
pean social science from the 1920s onwards, with a focus on media studies. There are 
many epistemological rationales that limit the extent to which researchers should aid in 
the reformation of society, and I divide them into three traditions: social engineering, 
administrative research and critical research. I argue that they are all equally normative 
in their foundations.
The second part builds on these traditions to present a framework for instructive me-
dia research, that is, research in which a normative goal is pursued with all the tools that 
social research can legitimately apply. I will present three sectors of the media that can 
be directly and indirectly controlled by the researcher: the media’s technical platforms, 
their editorial procedures, and citizens’ participation in the media. As suggested above, 
more democratic participation in mass media is the issue that most urgently needs to be 
resolved, and in Part II I will point out a possible strategy of reformation in the field. 
Part I: A History of Normativity
In social research, researchers carry a burden that can be called our normative anthro-
pology, defined as a more or less conscious set of “ideas connected with some notion 
of a human good, end, purpose, or function (ergon)” (White 2003: 5). Researchers have 
a tendency to promote values in their capacity as researchers, because we do this in all 
other realms of life. Humans are subject to unwieldy processes such as emotional attach-
ments, convictions and beliefs, and all researchers have a value orientation that will leave 
traces in their research projects, journal articles and monographs. Note that because this 
influence is unavoidable, it works even if the researcher is completely unaware of it.
Below I will discuss three research traditions ranging from the 1920s to the present 
time, namely social engineering, administrative research and critical research. I will 
formulate their three different normative anthropologies, and clarify how they intend to 
use their values to influence society. While other classifications of media research are 
empirical (Jensen 2000; Carlsson 2007), mine is ideal typical.
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In the decades before World War I, people in the US were inspired by the progressive 
movement, where philosophers, philanthropists, industrialists and politicians believed 
that inequality and injustice could be alleviated by technological means. The progressive 
ideology was not communist or capitalist as much as rational and efficient. This political 
attitude has been crucial to many US presidents and their administrations. Starting in 
1914, Woodrow Wilson’s administration spent more money on industrial development 
than any earlier administration had done. In the late 1920s, Herbert Hoover reinvigorated 
spending on industrial development, and this was taken over by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
New Deal in the 1930s and 1940s (Johnson 1997: 634ff). 
Social engineering has a highly visible value orientation. It solved the problem of 
unavoidable influence by using influence like a politician or businessman would, albeit 
with the established methods of natural and social science. Progressive academicians 
took advantage of research methods to mould institutions and technologies in industrial 
states. In the political climate after World War II, university researchers played a crucial 
role in inventing and implementing new structures in society. With the state as the com-
missioner, researchers in Europe and the US aided great building projects, the controlled 
migration of large numbers of people, medical treatments, education reforms, and a great 
deal more. In the Nordic countries, the social-democratic reforms of the national Labour 
parties from the 1940s onwards were greatly influenced by the experimental approach 
to reforming society (Halvorsen and Stjernø 2008). 
Andrew Feenberg (2006) reminds us that technocratic research projects of the mid-
20th century often failed miserably to improve conditions. Housing projects failed to 
improve living conditions for the inner-city poor, and reforms in psychiatry and health 
care introduced unforeseen problems that were in some cases worse than the initial 
situation. And indeed, the atomic bomb was created as a consequence of the large-scale 
concerted action of researchers. 
There is a contemporary version of progressive research that can be called ‘action 
research’. Although it is not widespread in Nordic media research, it merits discussion 
in the present context because of its clearly formulated normative anthropology. Ac-
tion research is concerned with improving the situation of the people involved in the 
research project, for example by supporting re-education, equal participation and free 
choice (Argylis et al. 1985: 8-9). The purpose of a project is determined together with 
the people who would benefit from it if the hypotheses are good. The social mobilization 
towards “emancipatory action research” in certain university milieus is well described 
in Reason and Bradbury (2001) and Fals Borda (2001). Action research is normative in 
the sense that it is presumed that the end result, however grounded and open-minded the 
procedures are, will be better for you than your present conditions. It is justified by the 
idea of making people better persons, without requiring that everyone involved agrees 
or is even aware that his/her behaviour has improved. Owing to the learning process 
the participants go through, the research process itself may have political value. Chris 
Argylis says that “science in becoming experimental has itself become a mode of practi-
cal doing” (Argylis, p. 6).
The work of John Dewey (1859-1952) contains a classical rationale for this research 
approach. Dewey argues that we as humans always have a certain responsibility for 
our actions because they are intentional. It is easy to overlook this fact. “We rise in the 
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to what we are doing” (Dewey 1908: 9). But where there is conduct, Dewey continues, 
“there is not simply a succession of disconnected acts but each thing done carries forward 
an underlying tendency and intent” (Dewey 1908: 11). He argues that these seemingly 
neutral actions have moral implications, and demands that people learn about the con-
sequences of their actions, and let this knowledge guide their behaviour.
The primary objective of Dewey’s research ideology is the facilitation of enjoyments, 
or the pursuit of happiness in line with the American constitution. This denotes human 
well-being in the broadest social, economic and political sense. In Dewey’s view, en-
joyments that issue from intelligent conduct are particularly valuable, and should be 
cultivated in social life. Knowledge about the political workings of society is supreme 
among these intellectual enjoyments.
The more connections and interactions we ascertain, the more we know the ob-
ject in question. Thinking is search for these connections. Heat experienced as a 
consequence of directed operations has a meaning quite different from the heat 
that is casually experienced without knowledge of how it came about. The same 
is true of enjoyments. Enjoyments that issue from conduct directed by insight 
into relations have a meaning and a validity due to the way in which they are 
experienced. Such enjoyments are not repented of; they generate no aftertaste of 
bitterness. Even in the midst of direct enjoyments, there is a sense of validity, of 
authorization, which intensifies the enjoyment (Dewey 1994: 154).
Dewey wanted to use scientific methods to increase the number of such intelligent enjoy-
ments. He would not have been content to study behaviour a posteriori as most academi-
cians would. He recommended experimental methods, where research instruments are 
trained on a specific dimension of social reality to find out how it functions, and to find 
out whether the newly acquired knowledge can influence its functions in the future.
Dewey wanted to discover social mechanisms and predict the consequences of various 
forms of social action. “Experimental empiricism in the field of ideas of good and bad is 
demanded to meet the conditions of the present situation”, he stated programmatically 
(Dewey 1994: 149). This is a progressive statement. Dewey wanted the researcher to 
make prescriptions for behaviour, and potentially build restrictions into a technological 
or social system so that they encourage only some types of behaviour. Dewey argues 
that the social scientist’s true purpose (ergon) is to facilitate the kind of actions that lead 
to good consequences in society. The pursuit must necessarily take the form of social 
experimentation and attempts at political reform. Remember that Dewey reflected on 
this method in the early 20th century, before the moral failures of social engineering and 
technocracy had become evident.
And indeed, there are several problems with the position that Dewey and the later 
progressive researchers championed. John Durham Peters rejects the progressive ideol-
ogy as simply naive. They are “old democrats who have a touchingly virginal faith in 
the goodness and intelligence of the people” (Peters 2003: 224). This criticism is cynical 
if Durham Peters means to suggest that there is no goodness and intelligence among 
people, but quite reasonable if he means that researchers may not be able to engage it in 
the pursuit of their goals. Another prominent critic, James Carey, is sceptical of this kind 
of interventionist research, and refers to its practitioners as “the new priesthood” (Carey 
71989: 94). He does not trust their moral stature to be as solid, or their pragmatic insight 
into society to be as deep, as the scope of their plans for social change may suggest.
The dilemma involved in Dewey’s position is that in order to promote good conse-
quences, you have to define which types of behaviour are good, and exclude a host of 
other forms of behaviour because they are bad, or at least not good enough. How do 
you choose which is which? Let us say that you were actually able to determine the 
criteria for good behaviour. Still there is a problem in that you may lack the motivation 
to keep on believing that your position is best, and you may lose faith in it before the 
project is completed. And if you actually manage to defend and promote it with full 
force throughout, haven’t you then entered the field of politics or even religion, so that 
in effect you have stopped being a researcher?
There is a further problem with Dewey’s instructive orientation. Let us say that you 
have not only managed to keep up your faith in a certain solution, but that you have 
even completed a wonderful media research project that promoted the preferred changes 
successfully. What if another researcher copies your methodology, which must have been 
very efficient, and tries to set in motion a completely different set of changes in another 
context? It may turn out that what you created was only an empty procedure for changing 
media behaviour, equally applicable to neo-fascism or the radical left. If your method 
can inspire any kind of change, then your progressive endeavour has failed.
Administrative Research from the 1940s
Other research traditions choose a safer approach to social change than the progressives 
did. The label “administrative research” was first attached to Paul Lazarsfeld and his 
research group at Columbia University in the 1940s, and has become a rather vague term 
referring to research justified by the values of an existing institution in society, whether 
it is a media company, a non-governmental organization, a state department or a local 
community. Administrative research is typically guided by the normative anthropology 
of the institution and not the researcher, and there is typically a low intensity of ethical 
engagement at the research end. 
Statistical media research is a good example of administrative research. Researchers 
compile audience figures for a television station, with a demographic breakdown and 
changes in figures over time. This may involve facts and figures about institutions like 
Danmarks Radio or Sveriges Television, and the policies, economics and organizational 
structures of public service broadcasting. The individual person is made very small in 
this approach. If you are interviewing 2,400 people in a quantitative survey, you must 
follow procedure, and you cannot be concerned with the well-being of the each indi-
vidual. Statistics necessarily removes the depth of character of persons by cataloguing 
social facts about them.
Administrative research tends to be conservative in the sense that the facts and 
figures indirectly support the institutions in question, and very often do not relate to 
alternatives or faults with the existing ones. In practice, such research is often simply 
a means of administrating the status quo by making the norms of dominating agents of 
influence, like the state bureaucracy and big business, more acceptable to the public. The 
European Union funds a huge body of administrative research, for example COST A20 
“The Impact of the Internet on Mass Media in Europe” (2001-2006). Reports are filled 
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memorandum of understanding between researchers and the EU. The most commercial 
version of administrative research could be called assigned research. Semi-academic 
companies do research on behalf of, for example, telecom companies, without any ethi-
cal requirements of their own. 
Regarding the normative rationale, administrative research is associated with the 
position called ‘ethical neutrality’. You can achieve neutral scientific results in social 
research, provided you distinguish between the spheres of research and conviction. 
Theorists believe that the value orientation (which results from conviction) can be 
counteracted through objectifying procedures.
Julien Freund (1921-1993) considered that the societal influence of the social sci-
ences had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and he was concerned to curtail it. 
Freund’s approach is that of a classical ‘ethical neutralist’. He conceives of researchers 
as moral and political beings with an independent opinion of what is right and wrong 
in society. He conceives of personal conviction as essential for wanting to be educated, 
and wanting to learn about society through research projects. Freund particularly em-
phasizes the influence of conviction on the researcher’s selection processes. Only 
within a value-driven decision-making process can the scientist or scholar apply the 
procedures of scientific investigation, which consist of “accurate observation, criticism 
of texts, surveys and documents, determination of causal relationships, comparison, 
etc.” (Freund 1966: 53).
The influence of the value orientation on research procedures is alarmingly great, ac-
cording to Freund. Almost all intellectual processes involved in justification, discovery 
and documentation are driven by the value orientation. For example, it “determines the 
selection of the subject of study, i.e. it enables us to detach a definite object from reality, 
which itself is diffuse” and “once the topic has been chosen, it guides us in sifting the 
essential from the secondary, i.e., it defines the historical individuality or uniqueness 
of the problem in effecting a choice from any infinitude of details, elements and docu-
ments” (Freund 1966: 55-56). 
Still, the value orientation must be neutralized. Freund points a warning finger at 
social engineers and other researchers who are explicitly change-oriented or political 
in their work: “His task is to interpret, to analyze, to describe a situation, using all 
the resources of the scientific method, but not to contribute his own views or to call 
one opinion right and another wrong”. Freund presents a moral imperative for social 
research: “Science may deal with evaluations, provided that it does not evaluate them” 
(Freund 1966: 84). According to the position of ethical neutrality, the sociologist will 
cease doing scientific work the moment he himself expresses an opinion on those opin-
ions. It is consequently very important to distinguish between the spheres of research 
and conviction. The researcher is simply not allowed to promote his convictions in the 
way that social engineering presumes.
For the sake of his personal dignity, if for nothing else, the professor should con-
centrate on the teaching required of him, instead of playing the cultural reformer 
without the practical means of carrying out reforms, or parading the qualities 
of a statesman while lacking that basic requirement, a state to organize (Freund 
1966: 80-81).
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tation for cultural reform. It goes against the grain of research to postulate future action, 
and this is a requirement with serious repercussions for the political thrust of research. 
“The sociologist, just as much as the historian, is faced with a completed action or a 
given behavior, and must a posteriori explain its causes and motives, seek to understand 
its purpose and analyze the means used to attain it” (Freund 1966: 77). This strategy is 
supposed to effectively remove research from the sphere of conviction, and is in this 
sense starkly different from social engineering and critical research.
In my view, there are several problems associated with the position that Freund 
champions. The gravest problem is the attempt to make research on future situations 
illegitimate in the research community at large. In one sense this mentality actually 
involves a ban on thinking about the future, as the future lends itself easily to thoughts 
about how it should ideally be. This makes the whole notion of ethical neutrality sound 
rather unrealistic. 
The second problem with Freund’s requirements for research is that the constant 
influence it has on society is underestimated. Freund seems to presume that those who 
actively neutralize their value orientation and only “deal with evaluations, provided 
[he] does not evaluate them” (Freund 1966: 84) have consequently no influence on 
society and its politics. But this is certainly not the case. Researchers communicate a 
value orientation also when they contribute “neutrally” to the empirical understanding 
of a social practice, because the public’s knowledge of an already dominant behaviour 
is expanded instead of being refocused on something different. Researchers, however, 
may not be felt to be normative in their time, and they may not themselves appreciate 
the conservative influence they exert on others.
A third problem is the pretence of neutrality that researchers sometimes adopt. For ex-
ample, it may be opportune for the researcher to under-communicate controversial findings 
that might make the project appear politically incorrect, and in some cases researchers may 
feel uncomfortable if their findings are too politically correct. For both these reasons, there 
is a risk that researchers will present their results in cowardly or downright dishonest ways. 
Indeed, researchers who have explicit political agendas may sometimes be considered 
more honest than those who appeal to the court of ethical neutrality without convincing 
the readers that they actually believe neutrality is possible (Nyre 2005).
Critical Research from the 1960s
While administrative research tries to be as neutral as possible, critical research tries to 
be as partisan as possible. The label “critical research” was introduced with the social-
ist theory of the Frankfurt school after World War II, but gained widespread political 
momentum from 1968 onwards. Critical research is found, for example, in British 
cultural studies, feminism and multiculturally oriented social research. It typically has 
a clearly formulated value orientation that the researcher has formulated him-/herself, 
and therefore there is always a notable intensity of ethical engagement.
Critical researchers are driven by an intuitive sense of what is morally right and 
wrong. If you are happy about the current state of things, you will never become a critical 
media researcher. Critical media researchers wish to form alliances with ordinary people, 
who they think should be allowed greater freedom and not be so profoundly manipu-
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lated by media businesses. This alliance with citizens has a long tradition, for example 
among writers such as Bertolt Brecht (1932), Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1969) and 
Murdock (2005). The injustice and inequality in society motivate you to portion out the 
blame, and these moral indignations are typically quite personal and based on first-hand 
experience. Finlayson (2005: 84) points out that a moral obligation always addresses 
us in the first person. In a more methodological vein, political theorist Will Kymlicka 
states that all political theories are based on intuitions, for example the intuition that 
slavery is unjust. This is what drives political reasoning at the practical and theoretical 
level. “If a theory of justice matches our considered intuitions, and structures them so 
as to bring out their internal logic, then we have a powerful argument in favour of that 
theory” (Kymlicka 2002: 6). 
There is a version of critical research that can be called dystopian. The dystopian ver-
sion presumes that there is really no hope of improvement, because the commercial and 
political structures of society are already too rigid. Dystopian researchers are sensitive 
to what they conceive of as abuse of power by the dominant forces in society, and they 
protest this abuse forcefully in their work. Their criticisms are formulated in an ana-
lytic way, most often based on hermeneutic research methods (rhetorical analysis, text 
analysis, reception studies and historical studies). This attitude was easily adapted to the 
media industry and its popular cultures, relating for example to systematic inequality of 
political representation and information gaps favouring groups with great resources.
Although this dystopic anthropology is indeed rooted in visions of good future solu-
tions, there is often a strange lack of interest in describing courses of action that would 
lead to the desired future. This attitude is enthusiastically dystopian in a way that makes 
attempts at intervention seem fruitless. Nevertheless, there is an impetus for change in 
the desperation itself, and it can be contagious, fuelling the critical energies of the reader. 
Writers like Noam Chomsky and Naomi Klein have succeeded well using this rhetorical 
strategy. But the problem is that these researchers are not good at presenting credible 
alternatives to what they criticize, and it is highly unusual for them to try to build real 
alternatives with experimental methods, like a social engineer would do. It seems that 
the energetic formulation of negative criticism has worn them out.
Half a century after the emergence of critical media research, a liberal, postmodern 
form of “compassionate research” dominates the field. Researchers care very much 
about the personal satisfaction of individuals and subgroups in relation to their media 
consumption. There is a good example of this approach in Rodman and Vanderdonckt 
(2006), where the researchers are in alliance with music lovers, and are clearly also 
music lovers themselves. They analyse the business strategies of multinational record 
companies based on descriptions of music consumption in their own lives, and they 
indignantly criticize these multinationals for making people suffer their aggressive and 
unjust sanctions on musical culture. This intuitive alliance with interest groups or com-
munities or ethnic minorities or multicultural groups creates research of very specific 
social value, but with little interest for people outside the group in question.
When it appears that ordinary people cannot be fooled or tricked, or simply be wrong 
about things, the alliance with the citizen has gone too far. The psychological reward for 
taking such a socially responsible position is that you will come across as a humanitar-
ian, philanthropic researcher. You can live comfortably with the image of being naive 
because your motivation is so good. 
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However, just as there is something to learn from the objectivity of the administra-
tive attitude, there is also something to learn from the intuitive humanitarianism of 
critical research. In the 2000s, the mass media are structures of a magnitude that can 
hardly even be imagined by researchers, and there is reason to suspect that dominant 
organizations and businesses are not really interested in promoting democratic values. 
Critical research scrutinizes the morality of the fourth estate (which scrutinizes the gov-
ernment, parliament and the courts), and it strives to keep the mass media from gaining 
hegemonic power over the public sphere. Therefore such research is indispensable to 
any democratic state.
Part II: The Instructive Attitude
The subtitle of this article promises to relocate the researcher from the ivory tower 
to the control tower. The history of normativity makes it clear that researches have 
values and opinions about society whatever we do. We maintain dominant institutions, 
we form alliances with groups of citizens, and we inspire actions that will have good 
consequences for society. Media researchers have an influence on society just like busi-
ness people, state bureaucrats and politicians do, but while media researchers typically 
try to neutralize their influence to protect the legitimacy of their research, the latter are 
free to use their influence without feeling awkward or guilty. In the second part, I will 
argue that we have a moral duty to use our knowledge in an attempt to improve public 
communication. 
Stating that researchers should enter the control room is tantamount to saying that 
they should become active partners in the frenzy of innovation in the mass media. I have 
suggested that the most pressing issue is to democratize the new media to compensate for 
old failures. To get started, the researcher must find out what sectors of the media need to 
be controlled, and which of them he can reasonably expect to be able to control. As stated 
above, I will point to technical platforms, editorial procedures and citizen participation 
as the crucial sectors in this regard. Three writers are symbolically important in my 
argument, namely Marshall McLuhan, Jürgen Habermas and John Dewey, respectively. 
Here I quote them as authorities in the formulation of an ideal typical research strategy 
for media studies. More modest and empirically grounded approaches to the same topics 
can be found in Nyre (2007) and Nyre and Ala-Fossi (2008).
Technical Platforms
One of the sectors that media researchers can influence is the design of new platforms 
and interfaces. Like commercial innovators, researchers can test various set-ups of the 
technology, and see how participants react in terms of communicative qualities. Prefer-
ably, researchers should be able to build such platforms on campus, and experiment with 
them along with students and ordinary citizens. By shaping technologies in this way, the 
researcher can aid in the construction of good consequences, like Dewey requires.
My purpose is to strengthen the legitimacy of technical experimentation among media 
researchers by connecting Dewey’s pragmatism with Marshall McLuhan’s media phi-
losophy. McLuhan focussed on the ways in which electronic media work on our senses. 
He was among the first to think of the mass media as human environments in a sensory 
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and technological sense. McLuhan’s theories have a pronounced, some would say coarse, 
materialism. He says that “technological media are staples or natural resources, exactly 
as are coal and cotton and oil” (McLuhan 1994: 21). The media are physical entities that 
people are involved with perceptually every day, arranging their habits and preferences 
around them. ”Any technology tends to create a new human environment”, McLuhan 
claims. “Technological environments are not merely passive containers of people but 
are active processes that reshape people and other techno logies alike” (McLuhan 1962: 
i). The mass media are so central to our everyday lives that it would be irresponsible 
not to include them among the basic practices of society, on a par with the right to vote, 
the school system and electrical infrastructures. 
McLuhan postulated that the message of the medium is its long-term effects on per-
ception, polemically adding that the present politically and socially relevant content is 
of minor importance. McLuhan boldly formulates a law about the relationship between 
technology and communication. 
For the ”message” of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace 
or pattern that it introduces into human affairs. The railway did not introduce 
movement or transportation or wheel or road into human society, but it accelerated 
and enlarged the scale of previous human functions, creating totally new kinds of 
cities and new kinds of work and leisure (1994: 8). 
A medium’s core characteristic is that it changes the ratio of the senses used in the 
effort to communicate compared to the previous ratio among members of a society. 
After becoming a prominent means of communication, it promotes and cultivates some 
perceptual activities more than others, and in this indirect way it causes social change. 
Methodologically, his conceptual probes into the experiential qualities of such environ-
ments are of continuing importance (see Bolter and Grusin 1999).
The quote above should not be rejected too hastily as deterministic. With some refine-
ment, McLuhan’s law becomes a useful analytic tool, and indeed, Moore’s law, which 
says that the processing power of computer chips will double every eighteen months 
(Rifkin 2000: 20), can be interpreted as a quantitative specification of McLuhan’s law 
in the domain of the computer. Nyre (2008b) contains a systematic historical application 
of McLuhan’s law to the sound media (telephone, radio, music recording).
Let me take the pattern of distribution in analogue broadcasting as an example of 
the democratic impact of technologies. Traditional radio and television have at least 
two technical features that are beneficial for democratic purposes: non-rivalry, in that 
consumption does not reduce the availability for others, and non-excludability, in that 
all citizens can receive the signal equally (Moe 2008: 25ff). These features have tra-
ditionally been used to create universal access to programmes for all citizens, and it 
creates a type of public sphere that is in principle shared by all. While the relationship 
between procedures and viewers feels quite personal, it is facilitated by an electronic 
infrastructure common to millions of people all over the world. This type of communica-
tion has been called ‘para-social interaction’ by Horton and Wohl (1956), “for anyone as 
someone-structures” by Paddy Scannell (2000), and also “secondary orality” by Walter 
Ong (1982), and it will continue to be of great importance for democracy. Nevertheless, 
non-rivalry and non-excludability are slowly losing momentum with the introduction 
of pay-per-view services and password-protected access, and what McLuhan calls a 
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‘change in scale or pace or pattern’ is clearly at work. 
New technology can jolt the prevailing regimes of communication for good and 
for worse. The medium’s behavioural restrictions are taught, conserved and translated 
within the technological system, and will die out if the technologies are removed or their 
everyday functions are taken over by newer solutions. A mass medium can be thought of 
as an expressive arena in which specific techniques of communication are created and 
kept active by a process of ‘naturalization’. To say that an interface is embodied means 
that the user’s perceptual skills are cultivated in one direction that becomes natural at 
the cost of potential qualities in other directions. The instructive researcher will create 
good consequences by replacing technologies, and the process of replacement can go 
on indefinitely. 
Editorial Procedures
A second sector that researchers can and must influence is the organization of editorial 
work among journalists and other media employees. Think of the specific requirements 
of producing a news bulletin, compared with a phone-in programme, a documentary or 
a soap opera. Researchers’ knowledge of editorial procedures must be well developed 
if they are to launch an experiment with democratization. Democracy relies heavily on 
predictability, in the form of stable procedures that allow everybody to know in advance 
what they will be participating in, and what the formal consequences of their actions will 
be. It is also important that they have equal opportunity to prepare for a performance. 
Researchers must make sure that this equality of access for all citizens is accomplished 
at the editorial level. 
Jürgen Habermas is famously concerned with the norms and procedures of ethical 
communication. He presumes that communication can change opinions, preferences 
and interests among citizens (Knapskog, p. 114; Calhoun 1992), and claims that speech 
has a special position in the public sphere. The lifeworld as a whole, and therefore also 
the public sphere, requires only “mastery of a natural language”, as “it is tailored to the 
general comprehensibility of everyday communicative practice” (Habermas 1996: 360). 
Habermas says that the crucial role of the public sphere is to be “a sounding board for 
problems that must be processed by the political system because they cannot be solved 
elsewhere. To this extent, the public sphere is a warning system with sensors that, though 
unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society” (Habermas 1996: 359). 
What basic procedures should a democratic medium have to be sensitive throughout 
society? A strong formulation of the procedural scheme can be found already in Struc-
tural Transformation (1962), where Habermas lets sociologist C. Wright Mills define 
the ideal public sphere on his behalf. 
In a public, as we may understand the term, (1) virtually as many people express 
opinions as receive them. (2) Public communications are so organized that there 
is a chance immediately and effectively to answer back any opinion expressed in 
public. Opinion formed by such discussion (3) readily finds an outlet in effective 
action, even against – if necessary – the prevailing system of authority. And (4) 
authoritative institutions do not penetrate the public, which is thus more or less 
autonomous in its operation (C. Wright Mills, quoted in Habermas 1990: 358).
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Interestingly, Habermas recommended this definition of the public because he found it 
particularly suitable for empirical investigations (Habermas 1990: 358). The first point 
on the list is problematic, as it would be impossible to accomplish a 50/50 share of 
speakers and listeners in states with 50-100 million inhabitants.
The second to fourth points on the list are more realistic, although highly demand-
ing even for the most advanced Western democracies. But do people have the chance 
to immediately and effectively respond to opinions expressed in public? It seems clear 
that journalists as a profession control the choice of topics and speakers on the air, 
and therefore decide who can effectively answer back. The media’s agenda setting has 
become a new type of power, which makes it impossible to think of the mass media 
as open-ended public spheres. Politicians and editors alike ought to more forcefully 
acknowledge the value of critical strategies of interpretation by audiences, Habermas 
suggests. But market strategies predominate, so that information is always mixed with 
entertainment, and the content is arranged episodically with complex relationships bro-
ken down into smaller pieces. The mass media as they function now have introduced a 
syndrome of depolitization of audiences, Habermas says (1996: 377).
Habermas implies that the media have themselves become authoritative institutions, 
so that instead of cultivating good communication in the public sphere they hamper 
it. Following his lead, one might fear that the procedures and patterns of behaviour 
are so locked into the platforms and interfaces of mass media that they have become 
unchangeable. A dose of brutal realism is required here. Langdon Winner argues that 
the designs and arrangements of industrial artefacts are similar to legislative acts or 
political foundations in establishing frameworks for public order that will endure over 
many generations. “Because choices tend to become strongly fixed in material equip-
ment, economic investment, and social habit, the original flexibility vanishes for all 
practical purposes once the initial commitments are made” (Winner 1986: 29). The 
work of Jacques Ellul (1964) and Albert Borgmann (1984) represents similar critical 
perspectives on technology. 
If we go along with this argument, it follows that it will be very difficult to change 
the mass media’s authoritative and undesirable procedures. But regardless of the sober-
ing nature of Winner’s argument, it opens up a reconstructive potential that Habermas 
doesn’t see. The problem is that Habermas isn’t constructively concerned with technol-
ogy, and he fails to investigate exactly how public deliberation is affected by the various 
platforms it appears on. If media technology is not considered a central arena of the 
struggle for power and influence, then the potential for change in the mass media will 
be thrown out with the bathwater.
Citizen Participation
The researcher can control features of the technical platforms and the organization of 
editorial procedures. But this control would lead nowhere without greatly increase pub-
lic participation by ordinary citizens. The third sector that the researcher can and must 
influence is people’s willingness to participate in alternative procedures of communica-
tion on alternative platforms, and this must be done by forming alliances with various 
groups of citizens. Democracy cannot work properly without grassroots participation. 
Researchers can influence civil society organizations, activists, protesters and grassroots 
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movements. The rationale for such alliance-building can be found in writers as diverse 
as Henry Jenkins (2006), Coleman and Gøtze (2001) and Peter Dahlgren (2005).
The philosopher John Dewey has something symbolically important to say. He was 
deeply concerned about the condition of the public sphere in modern democracies, and 
felt that the mass media are pushing people apart instead of pulling them together. He 
said: “There is too much public, a public too diffused and scattered and too intricate in 
composition. And there are too many publics, […] with little to hold [them] together in 
an integrated whole” (Dewey 1991: 137). Procedures in which the masses do not have 
the chance to inform the experts of their needs will become an “oligarchy managed in 
the interest of the few” (1991: 208). Dewey wants to experiment with more community-
building in public spheres. “The man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches 
and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge of how the trouble 
is to be remedied” (1991: 207).
Being a politically conscious person implies a reflexive consciousness about goals 
and values, and this Dewey calls intelligence. He uses the term in a moral and not psy-
chological way. Intelligence is “conduct in which the individual thinks and judges for 
himself, considers whether a purpose is good or right, decides and chooses, and does 
not accept the standards of his group without reflection” (Dewey 1908, x). In order to 
be a responsible citizen, you must be willing and able to address the interests of your 
community in public, with the means at your disposal.
The most immediate means at citizens’ disposal is verbal language, and it is a crucial 
task for media researchers to cultivate it among students and promote it in public. Interest-
ingly, Dewey, just like Habermas, promotes live speech. ”The winged words of conversa-
tion in immediate intercourse have a vital import lacking in the fixed and frozen words of 
written speech” (Dewey 1991, 218). Speech can help laypersons and social groups recon-
cile themselves more intelligently to each other, and do so in public arenas with relative 
ease. The alliance with citizens must be established with both qualitative and quantitative 
methods, and must feed into the construction of prototypes and editorial procedures.
Conclusion
Research-driven change in the mass media is possible, and there should be more of it. 
In the introduction, I stated that we may not have improved the quality of communica-
tion just because we have invented electronic arenas such as television and the Internet. 
Communication may have become more efficient, but it may not have become more 
democratic, and the main reason for media researchers to enter the control room is to 
change the media in this regard. 
My argument is quite optimistic with respect to researchers’ ethical engagement, 
theoretical rationale and empirical opportunity to effect change in society. But in closing, 
I will point out a dilemma inherent in all attempts at change and improvement. Even if 
researchers operate from a concerted plan for how to change the technical platforms and 
editorial procedures and how to inspire citizen participation, we cannot know in advance 
that the result will be good. The sluggishness of the social world will lead to a brutal 
falsification of theories, and enforced reorientation of value orientations. Researchers 
must acknowledge that if it doesn’t work, it doesn’t work, and then we must orient our 
attempts at improvement towards other, more promising facts on the ground.
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A reflexive researcher knows that failure to change the media is a more-than-likely 
outcome. Fortunately, a research article that explains why a platform and a set of proce-
dures should be abandoned is just as valuable as one that explains why they are a great 
success. In both cases, a step has been taken in the direction of improvement.
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